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Opium and the Beginnings of Chinese Capitalism 
in Southeast Asia
Carl A. Trocki
The article suggests that the development of Chinese capitalism in nineteenth-century
Southeast Asia was intimately connected to the participation of Chinese merchants in the
financing and operation of opium revenue farming concessions. It examines the
development and structure of the opium farming system as it operated in the region.
This article deals with the relationship between opium revenue farming and the
development of capitalist enterprises in Southeast Asia. It examines the role which
opium played in the transformation of all Asian economies during the late eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. While few would deny that the unprecedented expansion of
the opium trade by European traders had a major, usually destructive impact on Asian
economic systems and political and social institutions, the long-term results of opium in
the Asian, particularly Southeast Asian, economies are less well understood. Most
specifically, the opium farming systems which existed in virtually every Southeast Asian
state (as well as parts of China and India) were important adjuncts of capitalist
development in the region.
The practice of farming out portions of the state’s revenue was a common one in
pre-modern Southeast Asia. In order to collect a tax from their population without
spending scarce resources on bureaucracy and infrastructure, most colonial
governments, together with indigenous political entities, preferred to ‘farm out’ revenue
collection to private individuals. They would auction off the right to collect a specific tax
or to hold the monopoly on the distribution and sale of some excisable item, such as
liquor or opium. The monopolist, or farmer, as he was called, provided his own
organisation to carry out the task and charged as much as he felt economically realistic
to the consumer, paying his overhead and rent to the government and pocketing the
remainder as his profit.
There were many different types of farms in nineteenth-century Southeast Asia,
including farms for liquor, pork, prostitution, gambling, markets, tolls, capitation taxes
and others. Of all the various farms which we find in nineteenth-century Southeast Asia,
opium was by far the most lucrative. Opium generated a high level of cash flow and thus
created large pools of capital. There were, then, numerous links between capitalist
development in Southeast Asia and the opium farms and farmers. More importantly,
however, the farms also financed commodity production and helped to generate the
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infrastructure for consumer economies. These institutions helped to create and finance
the state structures that protected businessmen and their profits. I have argued elsewhere
that free trade in ports such as Singapore and Hong Kong was possible only because
opium revenues provided such reliable and lucrative flows of cash to the colonial
governments. In fact, all Asian governments depended upon opium farms for major
portions of their revenue.1
If we look only at the returns to governments from these institutions, it is clear that
the entire colonial project was heavily reliant on opium revenues. In fact, we could even
argue that it would have been impossible without them. Certainly this was the case for
Singapore and the other Straits Settlements, where opium accounted for between 30 and
60 per cent of the locally collected revenue in every single year for the entire century after
1819, and generally averaged between 40 and 50 per cent of total annual revenues. Other
colonies were less dependent on opium and drew revenues from a variety of other
sources including trade, land rent, capitation and export production. Nevertheless,
opium revenues still came to make up an important and often crucial share of their
colonial budget.
Between 1886 and 1895, the Netherlands Indies’ farms supplied 18 per cent of the
colony’s revenue. This figure is based on the total revenues, which included profits from
colonial enterprises and trading commodities delivered to Holland. If we look only at tax
revenues, opium actually constituted about 35 per cent. In French Cochinchina opium
was the single largest revenue-generating operation for two decades; between 1861 and
1882 the Saigon farm contributed about 30 per cent of the colonial revenues. In Siam the
opium farm generated one-seventh of the total government revenue and by 1905-6 it had
risen to nearly one-fifth. The opium farms were less important in British Burma and the
Philippines, but they still generated significant revenues.2
By the 1880s, there were a number of relatively distinct types of opium farming
systems in operation in Southeast Asia. Although Chinese capitalists ran all of the farms,
not all consumers of opium were Chinese. There were areas such as Java, central Siam
and perhaps Cochinchina and Tonkin where the majority of the users were indigenous
Southeast Asians. By contrast, there were those areas such as the tin fields of western
Malaya and the pepper and gambier villages of Johor and Riau where the consumers
were exclusively Chinese. The ethnic identity of the users signalled an important
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distinction in the overall structure of the farms themselves. While both types generally
contributed to the extension of the power and expansion of revenues for the colonial
states, the ‘all-Chinese’ revenue farming operations seem to have been the most dynamic
economically.
By the end of the nineteenth century, farms in urban areas had begun to operate
along lines that were relatively distinct from those in Java and Malaya. These urban farms
were different in that they often had no direct links to specific elements of the local
economy, but rather depended on a consuming population drawn from the variegated
membership of the urban working classes. These tended to be labourers engaged as
rickshaw pullers, stevedores, coal-heavers, porters, or working in general construction
and the building trades.
Opium farms and capitalism
Before the nineteenth century, it is no exaggeration to say that capitalism did not
really exist in Southeast Asia. While there was a certain amount of production for export,
it was inevitably handwork and rarely did the actual producer obtain a cash income for
his or her labour. Such efforts were usually carried out as minor adjuncts to subsistence
production. Even those who did produce for the global market rarely sold their goods
into the market and they consumed even less from it. Many exchanges were ritualised
and took place within relations of dependence. Despite centuries of commerce, there was
no real middle class in any Southeast Asian society, nor was there any ‘free’ wage labour.
There were no properly commercial forms of production, finance or banking and there
were no systems of law that would have protected or regulated such enterprises. Rulers
were arbitrary and absolute; wealth in itself could not effectively exist without the
protection of the power elites. Such elites could and did regularly confiscate or otherwise
appropriate to themselves all economic resources that they came to covet.
Capitalism came with European colonialism and with the connection of Southeast
Asian economies to the global capitalist system. It should not, however, always be
assumed that Europeans themselves consciously created capitalism in Southeast Asia.
Except for drawing in products and making cash and import products available,
European institutions did not readily interface with Southeast Asian economies. The
Chinese largely created capitalist institutions and forms of organisation in this region;
Chinese-run opium farms had a very important role in this process.
Opium farming was closely tied to the development of many forms of Chinese
business in Southeast Asia. It was, first of all, probably the biggest single moneymaking
operation of all the various occupations in which Chinese were engaged. Opium farmers
were inevitably the richest and most powerful individuals in their communities. While
the day-to-day business of running an opium farm was quite mundane, the farmers were
generally masters of large-scale, rent-taking enterprises. They and the farms performed
several important functions in the growth of capitalist economic structures in the region.
In the first place, they pulled together the financial resources to operate the farms as
businesses. They organised large groups of investors into companies or kongsi, as they
were then called. The farmers then managed these investments and made them grow. In
this regard, the farms, particularly the opium farms, were important vehicles for capital
accumulation. It can be argued that they were the first and perhaps most effective means
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of accumulation in nineteenth-century Southeast Asia.
A second important role in capitalist development was the close relationship that
came to exist between the farms and systems of commodity production. In particular, the
production of exportable commodities such as tin, gold, pepper, gambier, sugar, rice and
a number of other products was closely tied to the opium farming system. China
provided the first real source of free wage labour in Southeast Asia. As immigrant
workers moved into the region during the nineteenth century, most of them were
recruited for tin or gold mining or else for the planting of pepper and gambier, sugar,
tobacco and, ultimately, rubber. These mining and planting operations were generally
found in Malaya, Sumatra, southern Siam, Tonkin, Borneo and a few other places. In
more populous parts of Southeast Asia, such as Siam, Java, Cochinchina and southern
Burma, a move was made to expand rice production as well as a number of other
commercial crops, including sugar, coffee, cloves and indigo. In these areas, the labour
force was largely indigenous, and Chinese labour was less significant.
These systems of production were partially or completely linked to the market,
depending on their location. Chinese labourers such as those found in Malaya, Borneo
and Sumatra produced for the market. They worked for wages or shares and were also
supported by a market for their consumption. Very often, their worksites were far from
major colonial or other urban settlements and were supplied entirely from outside
sources. Normally, the capitalists who supported production would advance provisions
to the labourers in exchange for their products. In addition to profiting from both a
mark-up of the value of the provisions and a discount of the produce, these investors also
held shares or controlled the opium farming concessions in the area where the labourers
worked. They thus were in a position to absorb a large share of the latter’s wages through
sales of opium. The labourers ultimately found themselves deeply in debt to the
capitalists, and frequently addicted to opium as well; they were thus locked into a cycle
of both debt and addiction. The capitalist, for his part, was able to rely on supplies of
valuable commodities at extremely low prices, and could count on having a captive
labour force.
The farms freed up capital, which allowed the Chinese who invested in production
to expand their operations or to diversify, and at the same time established a class of
consumers. Opium thus became one of the first mass-consumption commodities in
Southeast Asia. The cash flowing from opium purchases not only enriched the farmers
and their shareholders, but also supported the newly established colonial states, as we
have already seen.
By the end of the nineteenth century, there existed a bourgeoisie and a working class,
which were linked together by systems of commodity production and consumption.
Increasing amounts of industrial raw materials were being exported from Southeast Asia,
and wage-earning populations there were dependent upon consumables delivered by
global capitalist enterprises. Large, jointly owned financial syndicates had come to
dominate the economies of the region and were supplying capital for a wide range of
activities by the new class of Chinese entrepreneurs. It will be useful to look at these
systems in more detail and to note the changes that took place in the revenue farming
systems by the end of the century.
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Malayan opium farms
In the type of opium farm which existed in Singapore, Johor and western Malaya,
the vast bulk of the consumers were Chinese labourers. This type of farm was common
in areas like the Malay world where indigenous population densities were typically low
and where large concentrations of immigrant labour were necessary to extract some
specific commodity. Another significant aspect of these farms was that they were
integrally attached to specific commodity production enterprises – tin, pepper and
gambier, sugar, etc. There was a regional integrity to these farming systems: for instance,
the major investors in the Singapore and Johor farms prior to 1880 were the same
capitalists who dominated the pepper and gambier business.3 The entire area around
Singapore where pepper and gambier were grown came to be dominated by the same
opium farming syndicates. Likewise, the tin-mining taukeh of Penang controlled the
farms of Perak and Selangor. Like Singapore, Penang then became the centre from which
the opium farmers – who also invested in tin-mining operations – dominated the local
economy. During the mid-nineteenth century these farmers and their secret society allies
were key players in the disturbances over tin mining in the western Malay states.
Organisationally, these farms had come into being as a result of an evolutionary
process. Chinese kongsi were created as joint enterprises which often included Chinese
merchants and labourers. Initially, it seems these had provided a structure for labour
organisation and investment, particularly in the parts of Southeast Asia removed from
colonial rule and in locations with predominantly non-native populations. The kangchu
system which characterised production in Johor, Singapore and Riau grew out of
Chinese socio-economic institutions.4 The same was true of the gold-mining kongsi of
Borneo and the tin-mining enterprises of Bangka and the Malay Peninsula. All bore
some resemblance to, and ultimately had a connection to, a secret society organisation.
These institutions tied capital, labour and specific commodity production systems to
opium.
Initially, it seems, many kongsi were formed as partnerships between labourers on
one mine or plantation and the investor who supplied capital in the form of tools,
provisions and transportation. The merchants or organisers were usually responsible for
procuring the necessary permission for the venture from the local authorities, in the
process obtaining the rights to farm opium, spirits and other consumables. Ideally, when
the goods were produced, each member of the kongsi would gain a fixed share in the
profits. In this system, the large investors gained the exclusive right to sell the produce on
the market, and also to supply the community of producers through a local shop.
Ultimately, this arrangement evolved into a sort of company store set-up whereby the
labourers ran up debts against their future shares or wages. In a typical nineteenth-
century kangchu settlement in Johor, the kangkar5 shops would provide the labourers
with whatever consumer goods they needed, including opium. Letters of authority
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usually gave the kangchu the rights to sell opium and pork and to manage gambling,
pawnbroking and prostitution concessions. Ultimately, it is clear that opium became the
most important commodity traded at these shops.
While it may seem extraordinary by modern standards, contemporary observers
believed that opium was a necessity of life for these coolies. In contrast to contemporary
anti-opium propaganda, much evidence suggests that opium did not immediately turn
its users into soporific vegetables or sunken-chested hulks. Some commentators report
that coolies could work half the day, sit down for a rest, take a few puffs from an opium
pipe, and then get up ‘refreshed’ and work for several more hours. This view was
expressed by John Anderson, a Singapore merchant interviewed by the Royal
Commission on Opium, which was sent by the British Parliament to investigate the trade
in 1894:
I have travelled on both sides of the Malay Peninsula, over tin mining districts, and
have seen thousands and thousands of Chinese miners working in swarms at tin
mines, displaying physical energy and endurance that the white man, under similar
conditions, could not have and apply, and at the same time keep his full health ... And
when I have seen these Chinamen after working all but naked for hours together in
water up to their knees, go back to their quarters, and either before or after their meal,
or both, smoke a pipe or pipes of opium apparently without prejudicial effect, I have
marvelled at the arbitrary inconsistency of some people in Britain who, with no true
knowledge of the matter ... would say to (a Chinese) ‘Opium you shall not have.’6
It would be a mistake to dismiss comments of this sort out of hand. Given the dismal
conditions under which Chinese coolies laboured, we should consider the possibility that
opium was in fact a necessity, that it was a ‘work drug’. Opium is a sovereign painkiller;
it reduces fever, stops up the bowels and eases the mind, making it possible for one to
forget loneliness, hopelessness, hunger and fatigue. These men lived and worked in some
of the most unhealthy conditions in the world with literally no medical care. Lenore
Manderson’s description of health conditions on Malayan estates gives an idea of the
problems they faced:
Poor hygiene and sanitation led to high rates of diarrhoeal disease and helminthic
infections, particularly ankylostomiasis (hookworm). Although some contemporary
commentators argued that coolies were reluctant to use the latrines because of ‘terrors
of darkness ... sickness-producing odours and ... restrictions of caste’, lines usually
lacked latrines and as a result soil pollution was pervasive, the grounds around the
lines and beyond were dirty and infected. Poor drainage systems, the disruption of
undergrowth, and swampy ground favoured the breeding of Anopheles mosquitos, the
vector of malaria, and hence the incidence of malaria was also typically high despite
considerable variation with respect to both the vector and endemicity.7
Given this situation, opium appeared to solve many problems.
Most writers, while remaining aware of the addictive quality of opium, still saw that
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it had many useful medical applications against the numerous illnesses endemic in
tropical Asia, and opium was a common element in many native and European remedies
during the nineteenth century. Writing as late as 1938, Jacques Dumarest observed that
‘opium … is a valuable medication for many sicknesses that are particularly common in
the Far East. According to the dosage and the time, its effects are by turn stimulating,
calming, analgesic, and sleep-inducing.’ Dumarest also noted its use against cholera,
dysentery and malaria as well as beri-beri and neurasthenia.8
On the other hand, it remains clear that opium was not really a cure for any of these
diseases. It masked the symptoms and perhaps did the user a disservice because it was
possible to ignore the messages of pain and discomfort and go on working while the
disease undermined his strength and left him vulnerable to more serious health problems.
One thing is clear, however: European contemporaries understood quite well both the
positive and negative effects of opium. Some could be quite critical of it and outspoken
condemnations of its use were not uncommon, and it cannot be said that Europeans were
unaware of the dangers. As early as 1809 a witness before the Penang Grand Jury claimed:
The effects of the use of this drug are so injurious and destructive to the human
constitution that the minds of those who use it are in a short time so debased as to
become incapable of any exertion, and their bodies so debilitated as to be rendered
totally unfit and unable to perform or undergo any corporal labour or fatigue, so that
their services and industry are not only lost to the community, but it must be
inferred...that they are under the necessity of resorting to robbery, plunder and
depredation to enable them to procure ... this pernicious drug.9
It is interesting that some of the same contradictory comments by anti-drug
campaigners have changed so little. One can find the same comments in current debates
about drugs, yet it is never clear how people who are so debilitated that they cannot work
are able to find the strength to carry out robbery and plunder. The evidence from this
period also lacks reliable scientific information on how long an individual could smoke
opium before he became addicted, nor do we know how long a habit could be maintained
at a given level, or how long one could use the drug before it really began to destroy his
physical health or his ability to maintain an occupation.
Whatever the case, life in the Malayan jungles was, if nothing else, nasty, brutish and
short. Manderson shows evidence that annual death rates varied between 50 and 250 per
1,000.10 Other reports speak of even higher death tolls. H. Warrington Smyth, an English
mining engineer who worked for the Siamese government, estimated that the death rate
for mining coolies in southern Siam was about 60 per cent overall and even higher for new
arrivals. In the face of these conditions, coolies demanded opium and would not work
without it. Arguing that mine owners feared running out of opium, Smith reported an
incident in which a mine lost 70 per cent of its work force through desertion when the
opium supply failed.11
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Given the alternatives, one faces a dilemma in choosing the best alternative for these
Chinese labourers. Was their situation worse than what they had left behind in China?
There the labourer faced unemployment, landlessness, overcrowding, disease, warfare
and banditry, as well as grinding poverty, yet he probably would have been too poor to
afford opium. In Southeast Asia there was at least the possibility of a different future. If
one were lucky and could overcome the burden of debt and avoid the dangers of the
jungle and the temptations of opium and gambling, he might save enough to return
home, buy some land and support a wife and family. If he were really fortunate, he could
become a wealthy taukeh himself. Even if he were unsuccessful, he might have passed his
short life with the comfort of opium.
Dr R. Little, writing in 1848, saw another possible future for Singapore’s labourer:
How different would be the condition of the people of this island if instead of
spending on Opium $417,884 yearly, they knew not the vice; that money hardly and
honestly toiled for would be spent in clothes, in food and better houses, the men could
afford to marry, a taste would be formed for finery, and something more would be
required, than bare rice the necessary of life ... instead of 40 or 50 living under one
roof, too often a mass of iniquity, a man and his family, or one or two single individuals
could afford to live in a house of their own...12
This was an idealistic picture, and one that offered little benefit to the capitalists and
to the Singapore treasury.
At the risk of seeming cynical, I would argue that the alternative future Little
envisioned was not only naïve, but was also exactly the one which the large British and
Chinese merchants and the colonial government did not want. There was no profit in a
population that saved its money and lived frugally. Were it not for opium, it would have
been impossible for the capitalist to remain in business. The products of Southeast Asia
– tin, pepper, gambier and even gold – would not have been competitive on the world
market. It was necessary for the cost of labour to be recaptured and recycled, as it were.
This was the case for the pepper and gambier economy that characterised all of the
Chinese labouring settlements of Singapore, Johor, Riau and later Negri Sembilan.13 The
proceeds from the sale of gambier and pepper in the Singapore market could pay for little
more than labour costs. The opium farm made it possible to produce the crop, pay the
labour force and then regain costs by selling the coolies opium.
The secret societies of Singapore and Malaya are a case in point. Initially, they seem
to have come into being as mutual support agencies and cooperative ventures to ensure
the pooling of resources by labourers and capitalists. Then there were the kongsi. In the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, these mining and planting settlements were
often located in isolated areas and were vulnerable to the attacks of pirates and others
who wished to exploit the labourers. Self-defence forces were necessary. Both labourers
and capitalists took shares in the ventures and divided the proceeds among themselves.
By the mid-nineteenth century, capitalists found powerful allies in colonial governments
and in European mercantile cliques. The Chinese taukeh were able to take control of the
kongsi and use the secret society thugs to intimidate the labour force and protect the
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revenue-farming concessions.
In Singapore, there were intimate links between certain groups of opium farmers
and the Ngee Heng Kongsi (also known as the Ghee Hin Hui). For much of the
nineteenth century, secret society conflicts in Singapore were actually wars between
opium farmers. Ultimately, when a single, consolidated farm was created, the Ngee Heng
ceased to play a major role in Singapore life and one small sub-group of the former
society gained employment as the protectors of the farm through the influence of their
patron, Tan Seng Poh. Later in the century the farmers were able to dispense with the
triads altogether and rely on colonial police forces to protect their monopolies.14
The Java opium farm model
If we look at the opium farming system organised by the Chinese in Java, there are
a number of important contrasts, but there are also fundamental similarities. This type
of farm was found in areas with a large population of Southeast Asia peasants, where the
indigenous people represented a significant proportion of the opium-consuming
population. In addition to Java, such conditions also prevailed in central Siam,
Cochinchina and Tonkin. Proportions of Chinese and native populations varied from
place to place, as did the amounts and types of opium used. In Indochina, for instance,
an individual Chinese smoked more opium than a Vietnamese. Colonial officials argued
that opium smoking only affected the Chinese and was not a problem for the Vietnamese
population, but since there were in fact far more Vietnamese smokers than Chinese, it is
probable that more money was made from the former than from the latter. The
government argued that the average Chinese smoker consumed 1.4 kg annually,
compared to only 200 gr. for his Vietnamese counterpart. Moreover, nearly 40 per cent
of the Chinese population used opium, compared to only 2 per cent of the Vietnamese.15
These statistics need to be understood in light of the circumstances. The Chinese
population was overwhelmingly young, male and gainfully employed. They were,
moreover, far outnumbered by the Vietnamese, who showed a much more balanced age
and sex distribution and seldom participated in the cash economy.
One common feature that these farms shared with those other areas was that the
farmers were almost always Chinese. Javanese had been smoking opium since the
seventeenth century. It is not clear when Chinese took over the business of collecting the
tax through a farming system, but one assumes it was quite early. Certainly by the early
eighteenth century the basic elements of the system were probably in place. By the
nineteenth century, the economies of the business were much more closely regulated and
tightly organised. Every regency had its own opium farm and the business was highly
competitive. One account described the opium farm auction as the ‘battle of kings’ where
the wealthiest, most powerful Chinese in Java gathered to outdo one another in their
fight for the concession.16
These farms were distinguished from the Malayan type in two other important
respects. First of all, the fact that many of the consumers were indigenous peoples meant
that governments had to be a little more circumspect about the opium trade and the
farming system. Particularly towards the end of the nineteenth century, when colonial
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governments felt the need to justify their existence by claiming that they were working
for the welfare of the natives, it was difficult to explain the opium farms to the
metropolitan public. In Malaya, Burma and the Philippines the farms could be justified
on the ground that they merely served the ‘sojourning’ Chinese. It was claimed that if
they did not get their opium, then they would not remain and the work would not be
done. This situation often placed colonial governments in French Indochina or the
Netherlands East Indies at a rhetorical disadvantage vis-à-vis moralists and ‘liberal’
economic interests in the metropole. They, too, tried to claim that opium-smoking was
primarily a Chinese vice. In Cochinchina, the French claimed that only the very rich or
the very poor smoked opium: those who had long hours of nothing to do, ‘les personnes
oisives ou l’oisiveté ’ [the idle rich or the unemployed].17 Their arguments seem rather
weak when one considers that as late as 1890, there were only about 56,000 Chinese in
Cochinchina, yet the French were able to sell the opium farm for $2 million annually.
One wonders who they thought was using the opium! (This was at a time when the
Singapore farms were going for $200,000 a year and the ‘user’ population was probably
less than 100,000).
Ultimately, colonial governments – first in French Indochina and then in the
Netherlands Indies – found it advantageous to join the chorus of voices raised against the
farming system. The farms were condemned, and with them the Chinese ‘exploiters’ of
the ‘people’. The Dutch ‘Ethical System’ and the French mission civilisatrice provided
rhetorical atmospheres in which the farms and the unscrupulous Chinese could be
criticised. By the 1890s, the farms were eliminated in both colonies and were replaced by
the ‘regie’, the government-controlled opium monopoly. This measure had the dual
advantage of eliminating the Chinese middleman and of greatly increasing government
revenues from opium sales.
The situation in Siam had a number of important differences. In 1851, after several
decades of unsuccessful attempts to ban opium in the kingdom, a farming system was
finally permitted and opium sales were legalised. This took place on the eve of the
Bowring Treaty which opened the kingdom to European commerce:
[I]n 1851... Rama IV set up an opium farm for the exclusive benefit of the Chinese.
This came about after certain Chinese petitioned the king to appoint them farmers to
manage opium strictly among Chinese in Bangkok and provincial towns, for which
they would pay an annual fee of 10,000 taels Siamese (£5,000). In addition to the right
to import opium for local consumption, the farmers could also export it to China.18
The Siamese government could also argue that opium was really only a Chinese vice
and one that did not affect a significant portion of the indigenous population. Since the
Chinese were immigrants, their behaviour really did not reflect adversely on government
policy. Chinese, it was claimed, were inveterate opium smokers and it was not the job of
the state (colonial or otherwise) to change their character. It therefore only made sense
to tax opium so as to prevent ‘excessive indulgence’.
A second difference from Malaya was that in Siam, Java and Cochinchina, links
between the revenue farming system and the local economy were more diffuse. Farmers
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were generally rich men who held opium farms as one of a number of enterprises.19
These usually included land, shipping, rice trading or plantations, but it is not clear that
Chinese capital was always a major factor in local production systems as it was in Malaya.
At the very least, Chinese investment was not usually responsible for the initiation of
these enterprises, as was the case in Malaya. Generally, it seems that the typical Javanese
peasant was involved in subsistence rice production as well as some form of forced
cultivation of commercial produce such as sugar, coffee, pepper or spices. Over the
course of time, however, the rice economy was monetised.
Much of the Chinese activity in rural Java was designed to bring peasant rice into the
Chinese dominated marketplace. The introduction of landrent stimulated the internal
produce trade, and as the Chinese penetrated Java’s interior from the north coast
during the nineteenth century, Chinese rice gathering activities broadened. Peranakan
entrepreneurs sought to monopolize the buying up of peasant rice region by region, a
process which was intimately tied to possession of the Opium and other government
Farms. It was no accident that the internal rice trade, the semi-monetization of the
rural economy, and the full scale development of the Opium Farm system occurred
simultaneously. Opium farms, as the strongest and most pervasive arm of the
Peranakan patronage constellations, were the primary banks and credit institutions of
rural trade. At the bottom of the Peranakan patronage hierarchies stood the rural
Chinese trader – perhaps an employee of the Opium farm...[who] entered into
commercial relations with village headmen and individual villagers...20
These traders made loans and advances on crops and advanced goods as well as
opium against crops.
Here it may be concluded that the primary purpose of the opium farm was to bring
the Javanese into the cash economy and to make him a consumer of commercial
products. The farm also gave the Chinese trader a hold on the local economy. In time,
this control came to be seen as a threat to the state and associated European economic
interests. In the meantime, the role of Chinese as farmers and as opium users became a
part of the European discourse on their colonies. Opium had to be sold because the
Chinese must have it, but the state, seeking to promote native welfare, sought to keep the
poisonous drug out of native hands.
This discourse was duplicated in some way in almost all colonies, and it led, oddly
enough, to an elimination of the farms and the creation of government monopolies. In
Indochina, the ‘native welfare argument’ was an important part of the government’s
campaign to take over the farms and organise a government monopoly. Use of opium by
the Vietnamese population was portrayed as a result of the ‘greed’ of the Chinese opium
farmers.
In a real sense, this political debate over the creation of the opium regie illustrated a
much deeper structural reality. Vietnamese representatives on the Colonial Council
claimed that the local Chinese merchants abused, mistreated and exploited the
Vietnamese population. They sought the assistance of the French colonial
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administration to break the Chinese monopoly over trade in Cochinchina. For their
part, the colonial administration used this ethnic antagonism to divide and rule.21
It should come as no surprise, then, that the farms in the French and Dutch
territories were taken over and turned into government monopolies far sooner than
those in British Malaya, where opium use by the native Malay population was not an
issue.
Another aspect of the farms in places like Java and Siam caused further concern for
colonial rulers. Successful management of Javanese, and by extension Siamese, farms
demanded a much closer series of patronage links with the indigenous and colonial
officials at all levels of the enterprise than appear to have been necessary in the Malayan
farms. Whereas in Malaya the farms were linked to specific mining or planting
settlements, usually all Chinese and separate from the local villages, here the farms were
organised around the local indigenous governmental structure, the regency or province.
Such arrangements meant that the farmer needed to cement his ties with the local
Javanese priyayi or Thai chao muang in order to successfully maintain his enterprise.
Thus we see the development of a wide range of patronage arrangements between local
officials and Chinese opium farmers.
Another feature of these farms was the reliance on a corps of Southeast Asian natives
to police the farms. In Malaya, farmers could rely on Chinese secret societies, but in Java
and Siam these were less useful. Chinese farmers in Java came to control gangs of
Javanese operatives. James Rush’s study of the Javanese opium farms indicates that the
mata-mata or revenue farm police were just the lowest level of a complex hierarchy –
both Javanese and Chinese – that made up the structure of the farming system.22 The fact
that opium farmers were becoming men of power within the indigenous societies was
thus seen as a threat to the governing order and became one more reason why many
colonial administrators were happy to see the farms eliminated.
Each of the first two systems had specific advantages and disadvantages so far as the
economic and political fortunes of the farmers were concerned. The Malayan farms had
most of the economic advantages. They were closely linked to specific commodity
production systems and were assured of a group of reasonably well-paid consumers so
long as the market for the commodity remained firm and so long as they had access to
areas in which it might be produced. Chinese coolies earned more and consumed more
and thus these farms seem to have been the more lucrative of the two types. On the other
hand, the vagaries of the world market and the volatility of the population caused
continual problems. If the system stopped expanding, as happened with the pepper and
gambier agriculture in the early 1880s, then it ceased to be the kind of cash cow that
Chinese capitalists had come to demand and it lost much of its attractiveness. Moreover,
this leveling off opened the way for competitors with greater cash reserves to come in and
buy the farms out from under the Singapore syndicate. In this case, the interlopers were
the Penang tin lords like the Khoos, the Kohs and ultimately the Khaws, who were able
to take over the Singapore syndicates. The ultimate weakness was a political one. The lack
of an indigenous patronage network left the pepper and gambier taukeh of Singapore
vulnerable when they lost favour with the colonial government.
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The Javanese farms had two major disadvantages. First, they drew their profits from
a far less affluent and far more dispersed population. Second, the sales of opium were tied
to the seasonal vagaries of the peasant economy. During the times of the year when there
was no labour for peasants, sales fell.23 These conditions meant the farms were simply not
as lucrative; nevertheless, it was necessary to maintain an extensive network of shops and
mata-mata, even though there were times when farm profits could not support them.
Thus, the integrity of the farm was far more difficult to maintain; because of its dispersed
nature it was vulnerable to smuggling and betrayal by unpaid employees.
The urban farms
Farms in all parts of Southeast Asia got progressively larger and more valuable with
the passage of time. It seems possible to conclude that there was a direct ratio between
the modernisation of the economy and the increase in opium smoking. Not only did
revenues grow, but so too did the number of users and the amount of opium consumed.
Again, it is difficult to draw conclusions about cause and effect. On the one hand, we
might conclude that as people got more money, they tended to spend it on opium. On
the other hand, perhaps the need to satisfy a habit gave people an incentive to work for
cash income. Wherever there was cash, there was opium to soak it up, and people who
used opium needed cash to pay for it.
Farms that included large urban areas grew the fastest and ultimately these became
the most important. As this happened, new threats to the farming system began to
appear. The connection between the farming system and one particular productive
industry tended to become less and less important. The ‘islands’ of commodity
production that had once characterised the Southeast Asian economic landscape (i.e.
gambier and pepper plantations, tin and gold mines, etc.) now became less prominent as
urban economies expanded into foci of more permanent population clusters. In the
middle of the nineteenth century, it is probable that a majority of Singapore’s opium
users, for instance, actually resided in the rural parts of the island and made their living
as pepper and gambier planters. By the 1880s, however, many of the planters had moved
on to Johor and Riau and the urban area had grown in both physical size and influence.
The Singapore farm thus became a truly urban farm, serving a variegated population
representing the entire range of city-based occupations, including coolies, craftsmen,
dock labourers and rickshaw pullers. This level of variety meant that a link to the
gambier industry was much less necessary for success in revenue farming ventures.
Similar trends occurred in other large Southeast Asian cities such as Batavia, Penang,
Saigon, Bangkok and possibly Manila.
In addition to their sheer size, the farms now required large amounts of capital to
finance them. Often, these sums could not be raised from within a single urban centre,
and if they could, there would be rarely more than one group of capitalists capable of
doing so. It was not only possible, but also necessary for the colonial government to seek
bidders from outside a given colony. Anyone would do, so long as they had the money
and the will. Coupled with this was the fact that the colonial police forces had enhanced
their ability to control the population. This meant that the economic and ‘political’
institutions through which the opium farmers had dominated their populations, along
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with the farms, were no longer necessities. If one had money, it was enough of a
qualification to run the syndicate. This meant that colonial governments had alternatives
to the tin-mining taukeh, the pepper and gambier merchants, or the moneylenders who
held the peasants in thrall. With the local police forces and the relatively compact areas
of the urban farms, the state itself could provide security for the farm monopoly. All of
these factors tended to enhance the power of the government vis-à-vis the farmers, and
the partnership between revenue farmers and colonial states began to be seen as less and
less necessary.24
The economics of the farms
For a Chinese to be a successful farmer, he needed several kinds of resources. In
addition to processing the drug, for which some sort of building, equipment and trained
personnel were necessary, the farmer also required either ownership or control of a
network of retail outlets. These were opium shops where small quantities (anywhere
from a ‘pot’ of one or two tahil to ‘tubes’ of several ‘hoon’) of chandu25 were sold on a take-
away basis, or else divans or opium dens where the drug was smoked on the premises.
Beyond these facilities, it was also necessary for the farmer to control a fairly large body
of private security personnel. Part of the contract involved the farmer’s responsibility for
the integrity of his monopoly. Even though the state passed laws to protect the revenue
farming system, it was the farmer’s business to police it. He thus controlled a private
police force as well as a network of informers. In Singapore, the police were called
‘chinteng’ or revenue peons, and in the 1880s a force of about eighty men were employed
in this function. The major job of these police and informers was to prevent the
smuggling of contraband opium into the farmer’s territory.
All of these facilities were all part of the farmer’s overhead. In addition, he had to
purchase his stocks of raw opium on the open market and, of course, pay the government
its monthly rent. What remained was his profit, which he divided amongst the
shareholders. It is clear that the profits could be immense, and normally the opium
farmers were the wealthiest and most powerful Chinese in all of Southeast Asia. The
evidence for this is quite compelling. Whether one looks at compendiums such as Song
Ong Siang’s One Hundred Years of Chinese History in Singapore, or more recent studies
on Chinese economic leadership in colonial Southeast Asia, it is clear that opium farmers
ranked among the wealthiest, most powerful and most respected Chinese in Siam and
the European colonies of Southeast Asia.26 Finally and most importantly, it was necessary
to already have wealth, power and respect in order to become an opium farmer, and thus
it was a profession which attracted those who already had gained money and influence.
It also helped them to keep it.
By the late nineteenth century, many of the farms for densely populated territories
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(such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Saigon and even Shanghai) demanded such large
investments that money was drawn from all over the region, and in some cases wealthy
Chinese resident in one colony would buy up or invest in the farms of another colony. As
early as 1880, the Singapore farms had fallen under the control of a group of Penang
merchants. At the same time, a one-time farmer from Singapore had interests in the
Hong Kong opium farm, while another was involved in the Saigon farm. Even early in
the nineteenth century, merchants in Penang and Singapore frequently held farms or
interests in farms in the Dutch territories of Riau and Sumatra. Later they also held
interests in Javanese farms. In 1886, Lee Keng Yam, a Melaka Chinese, headed a syndicate
which held both the Singapore and Hong Kong farms, as well as ‘some Dutch farms’.27
There are a number of important points here. The first is simply that the opium
farms were large, complex enterprises that involved enormous amounts of capital. As a
type of economic organisation, they were found throughout Southeast Asia and the
southern Chinese littoral. In fact, when we step back and look at the picture in its
entirety, we see that by the late nineteenth century the opium farming syndicates
constituted a large, segmented network of interconnected kongsi stretching from Burma
to Shanghai and extending as far south as Australia. In most cases, the wealthiest local
Chinese clique exercised a level of control or at least participated in the farms in their
area, but almost all of them depended on outside connections that usually reached
beyond the borders of their particular territory. The farms thus constituted a more or less
separate economic system that was dominated exclusively by Chinese. It was, moreover,
a network that integrated the opium economies of Southeast Asia and connected them
with those of southern China.
Over the course of the period between the 1870s and 1910, these kongsi tended to
get larger, more valuable and more international. One aspect of this growth was the
tendency of the farms to consolidate when left to themselves. Thus after 1870 the
Singapore opium farm gradually coalesced with the farms of neighbouring Johor, Riau
and Melaka; a similar process took place in the tin areas and in southern Siam. As a
result, larger and larger kongsi or syndicates were formed to finance the opium farms and
investment was drawn from further and further afield.
This tendency towards consolidation was not always looked upon with favour by
local governments, particularly the European colonial regimes. British and Dutch
colonial officials viewed Chinese as devious and cunning and saw the workings of the
revenue farms as mysterious and completely opaque. Clearly, the Chinese preferred this
aura of mystery, since a measure of their usefulness to the European regimes depended
upon the failure of these governments to understand their methods. The colonial
regimes, however, came to look upon this dependence as a sign of weakness and
vulnerability. They felt it necessary to be able to manipulate the farmers, at least to ensure
that the government got the best possible price for the farms, which depended upon
maintaining a level of competition among the farmers. If the government felt that the
farmers were cheating or were not being required to pay what the farm was worth,
officials were often known to invite other investors, even from outside the settlement,
and to encourage them to bid against the incumbent farmer. In some cases, a government
would not always take the highest bid if officials felt the farmer had become too
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powerful, or if they suspected a plot of some sort.
Farmers likewise developed their own set of strategies to deal with competition.
Sometimes, the various competitors for a particular farm would collude to offer a low
price and then combine their interests in a joint syndicate once the contract was secured.
Other times, a losing syndicate would attempt to smuggle processed opium into the
territory of a farmer who had outbid them. One perennial device was to buy the farm for
the neighbouring territory and smuggle across the border; another was to bribe the local
officials to look the other way. In the case of Malayan revenue farms, if the losing farmer
happened to be a major investor in a tin mining region, he might withdraw his capital.
The coolies who were dependent on his advances would then be required to go elsewhere
and the winning farmer would lose his population of consumers. Thus there was always
a game of cat-and-mouse between the governments and the opium farmers on the one
hand, and on the other, a partnership. The farmers got wealthy under the auspices of the
governments, while the latter earned revenue at no cost to themselves and, in the long
run, gained access to resources that allowed them to replace the farmers.
Finally, and perhaps most significant for capitalist development, farms became a
source of capital for other ventures. With their large and usually reliable cash flows and
their relatively low needs for long-term capital investment, the farms were ready sources
of cash. In the absence of a banking system in which Chinese felt confidence, the farms
often doubled as banks, serving as a vehicle for savings and therefore for capital
formation. There are reports that farmers in fact often made loans or paid other debts
using farm funds. Moreover, when opportunities for economic expansion presented
themselves, Chinese were usually ready to invest, and again the farms often provided the
capital. It was no accident that when Chinese began to create their own banks in
Southeast Asia, it was frequently former opium farmers who were among the first to try.
Chinese capital and the demise of the opium farms
After 1880, a series of crises began to shake the various revenue farming systems. In
the case of Java competition became increasingly cutthroat and smuggling rose to
unacceptable levels. The rising tide of this activity offered the Dutch government the
opportunity to increase its own police powers along with its general familiarity with the
opium business. Finally, when the additional stress of an economic downturn occurred
and several farms failed, the Dutch followed the French example in Cochinchina and
turned the Javanese farms into a state-controlled Regie. In many respects this takeover
was possible because a number of the farms had really become concentrated on urban
bases and were thus easier to police and more difficult to finance.
Increasing attempts by the British in Malaya and by the Dutch in the Outer Islands
to bring the local farmers more closely under control continued throughout the 1890s
and into the twentieth century. However, so long as Chinese capital, labour and expertise
were necessary to provide the products upon which European prosperity depended, the
farming system remained. Part of the ‘problem’, so far as British official and economic
interests were concerned, was the continuing need for Chinese labour. British capitalists
were regularly frustrated in their attempts to move beyond the tertiary level of
involvement in Southeast Asian economic activity. They could not engage in mining and
planting enterprises because they could not control Chinese labour, tied as it was to
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Chinese capitalists through the farming system.
Two new innovations in Malayan economic life changed this system. It was only
when rubber became available as a plantation crop (in place of pepper, gambier, sugar,
tapioca, etc.) that British officials found a crop which was compatible with some sort of
quitrent system whereby the government could actually treat land as a commodity.
British planters found that they could import their own labour force from India and thus
do without the Chinese. The second innovation was the increasing availability of and
necessity for steam dredging equipment in tin mining. As Wong Lin Ken has shown, by
the 1890s the growing scarcity of easily worked tin deposits necessitated techniques that
were beyond the technology available to Chinese labourers.28 Chinese capitalists could,
and did, continue to compete with British and other colonial economic interests, but
they found themselves increasingly at a disadvantage as the administrative and
technological revolutions progressed.
One group of Chinese, however, persisted and sought to retool and reform the ‘old
ways’ while acquiring as much of the new technology as possible. In their case, we see an
attempt to use opium profits to finance the move into more universal forms of capitalist
endeavour. The Khaw family of Penang, also known by the name ‘na Ranong’ in southern
Siam, almost succeeded in remaking themselves in the early part of the twentieth
century. Jennifer Cushman’s study of the rise and decline of this Chinese tin mining
dynasty shows what might be considered the last stand of the opium farmers. This family
in many ways combined the most useful aspects of both systems. They were located in a
border area, where they were able to combine a lucrative group of tin mining concessions
in Malaya and Siam with an extremely intricate network of patronage links with Siamese
officialdom at the local level and in Bangkok. They also developed an extensive network
of marriage alliances among the Thai elite as well as other prominent Straits Chinese
families of Penang and the surrounding areas. The fact that they lived both within a
British colony and at the same time under the protection of the Siamese crown gave the
Khaws a sort of leverage possessed by few other groups of Chinese.29
Cushman has shown how the family financial empire rose to challenge British
colonial interests and the imperial corporate affiliates under the management of Khaw
Sim Bee. Between about 1890 and the beginning of the First World War, Khaw and his
clan built upon the base of their tin mining enterprises in the West Coast Malay states
and southern Siam. By the beginning of the twentieth century, they controlled a vast
interlocking conglomerate which included engineering companies, smelters, shipping
lines, banks, insurance companies and a host of other related enterprises in addition to
the tin mines and revenue farms that they had originally possessed. Their aim, it seems,
was an effort to establish a degree of financial and technological independence that
would liberate them from the influence of European capital and free them from the
unfavourable pricing systems of British-owned smelters and shipping companies.
Cushman establishes a fairly clear case of opposition between the Khaws and the forces
of British capital and colonial government, particularly the Straits Steamship Company.
Indeed, the Khaw empire seems to have fallen at least partly as a result of legal
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manoeuvres by the British which cut the legal and financial ground out from under it.
What is interesting about this financial conglomerate is not its similarity to Western
corporate forms of enterprise; rather, it was a hybrid form which combined Western
styles of business enterprise with traditional Malayan Chinese family-business practices.
Khaw Soo Cheang, and later Khaw Sim Bee and two or three key members of the family,
coordinated general corporate-family strategy while each firm or concern was headed by
various relatives of members of the kin group, including those who had been brought in
by marriage. A second element in the Khaw business constellation was their willingness
to accept official positions within the administrative structure of Southeast Asian
governments. Khaw Sim Bee, while recognised as an important Penang taukeh, was also
the governor of Ranong Province for the king of Siam. Finally, the family business was
likewise buttressed by an enormous opium farming kongsi. This group of investors
capitalised the tax concessions of colonial and other Southeast Asian governments and
thus created considerable pools of working capital which provided much of the fuel for
the expanding economies of the period. Unfortunately, the network of opium farms –
which included virtually all of Malaya, the Straits Settlements, Siam and parts of Sumatra
– collapsed in a spectacular debacle in 1907. This effectively destroyed the Khaw empire,
but it also shows how opium farming could have acted as a bridge to other forms of
capitalism.
The major result of the bankruptcy of the Khaw farming syndicates was the takeover
of all of their opium farms by the Siamese and British colonial governments. From this
point onward, opium was sold through government monopolies. This was a major
setback for the development of Chinese capital, signalling an end to its long-standing
partnership with colonial governments. For the next half-century, Chinese capitalists had
to be content with the leavings of European corporations and were subject to the
restrictions on their roles as ‘foreign Asians’.
Despite this setback, it is clear that the opium farms played a major role in the
establishment of Chinese capitalism in the region. The farms appear to represent a sort
of transitional phase between ‘traditional’ or pre-market Asian mercantile practices and
the more fully modern corporate systems of the twentieth century. The significance of
these institutions has gotten relatively little attention from economic historians, and
certainly none at all from modern economists in their considerations of Asian
economies. Indeed, I believe that we are only beginning to understand the nature of these
structures, and so it may be necessary to reconsider much of what we think we know
about the period. We might also ask ourselves what elements of these economic
structures actually survive in present-day or at least subsequent institutional structures.
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